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Abstract
This paper explores the problem of assembling capital for projects. It can
be difficult to assemble capital, when it is disaggregated, for a project that
exhibits increasing returns. Small investors may be reluctant to participate,
as they may question the ability of the project owner to raise the additional
capital he requires. This suggests the possibility that agents with blocks of
capital (capital that is already aggregated) might earn rents. Similarly, agents
with “network capital” — that is, an ability to aggregate the capital of others —
may earn rents. In this paper, we develop a simple theory of capital assembly
and discuss the implications for investment and rent distribution.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the problem of assembling capital for projects. Under the usual
economic assumption of decreasing-returns-to-investment, this problem does not
arise; but when there are increasing returns over some range, investors may only
be willing to invest in projects when they believe others are willing to do so. In
such instances, assembling capital (or coordinating investors) is a relevant — and
often critical — consideration. This paper addresses the issue by viewing the pro-
cess of assembling capital as part of the equilibrium, and it explores the conse-
quences of capital assembly for a range of features of investment. One striking im-
plication is that investors with blocks of capital will serve as anchor investors for
projects and earn higher rates of return than small investors. Our theory also pre-
dicts that certain agents who possess a privileged network position can use their
“network capital” to improve overall investment and they receive outsize returns
for doing so.
Our theory speaks to a fundamental aspect of the investment process that exist-
ing models fail to address. In contrast to existing theories, which assume surplus
maximization, we emphasize the importance of scarce resources, such as block
capital, for the execution of valuable projects. This implies that these resources
earn rents — potentially large ones — in market equilibrium. It also implies that
institutions may be important, as they may affect the supply of these scarce re-
sources, and hence the extent to which valuable projects are implemented.
We analyze a model in which a project owner tries to raise capital for a project
that exhibits increasing returns over some range. We first show that by making an
anchor investment in the project, a large investor with a block of capital can move
the project from a “bad” equilibrium with low investment to a “good” equilibrium
with high investment. Since a large investor spurs others to invest by making an
anchor investment, he need not finance the entire shift to the good equilibrium
himself. We characterize the minimum capital block-size needed to effect a shift to
the good equilibrium — as well as the rate of return earned on such an investment.
Interestingly, by holding a subordinated claim rather than a senior claim (equity
or junior debt), a large investor can move the project to the good equilibrium with
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a smaller block of capital.1
We also consider the possibility that a central network actor might substitute
for block capital by coordinating small investors.
A key goal of the paper is to develop a simple approach to the problem of capital
assembly and increasing returns that can be applied in a variety of settings. The
details of our analysis, while subtle, can largely be ignored once they have been
considered. Our formal model is game-theoretic; but it boils down to a model that
is essentially price-theoretic. We present this simpler, price-theoretic treatment in
Section 2 and our formal model in Section 3.
There are many “real-world” examples that illustrate the capital-assembly prob-
lem. For instance, Warren Buffett’s investment in Goldman Sachs demonstrates the
power of blocks of capital. In September 2008, soon after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, Buffett provided Goldman with $5 billion — an investment that greatly
increased market confidence in the firm’s ability to weather the financial crisis. On
the back of Buffett’s investment, Goldman raised an additional $2.5 billion from
smaller investors. The deal was made on very favorable terms to Buffett. Berk-
shire Hathaway (Buffett’s company) received a 10% annual dividend on its “per-
petual preferred” stock, plus warrants to buy $5 billion of common stock at 8%
percent below the previous day’s closing price.2 By comparison, the investors who
provided the additional $2.5 billion did not receive nearly as favorable terms.
The founding of Federal Express, by Fred Smith, provides another example. A
sizable amount of capital was required to start the company. Before FedEx could
even open its doors, it needed to have in place a fleet of jets, a central hub with sort-
ing facilities, pickup and delivery operations in a large number of cities (initially,
twenty-five), and several hundred trained employees. Moreover, FedEx operated
at a loss for its first three years while demand for its service grew, in which time
the company lost $40 million. Smith had some initial seed capital (his own trust
fund being one source), which he quickly burned through, after which he faced a
freeze from investors. The situation became dire, with creditors threatening to stop
1A subordinated claim facilitates coordination; but a large investor may prefer a senior claim if
the project is risky. See the conclusion for further discussion.
2Bary, Andrew, “Warren Buffett Makes an Offer Goldman Sachs Can’t Refuse,” The Wall Street
Journal 28 September 2008, Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com.
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supplying materials and airports threatening to impound planes.3 In a last-ditch
effort, Smith met with the wealthy industrialist Henry Crown, founder of Gen-
eral Dynamics. Crown agreed to guarantee a $23.7 million loan from Chase. This
block investment helped Smith raise an additional $52 million and got the com-
pany through the critical period where it was operating at a loss. Crown’s terms,
like Buffett’s, were tough. They included, for instance, an option to acquire control
of Federal Express (an option which, fortunately for Smith, was never exercised).
FedEx also provides an example of the power of “network capital.” Fred Smith
was a well-connected graduate of Yale, where he had been a member of Skull and
Bones. He also had valuable airline industry contacts. He relied heavily on these
connections in raising capital and, perhaps even more critically, in assembling a
top-notch management team (a task that also involved coordination). Many of
FedEx’s initial employees were only willing to give up secure jobs at other firms be-
cause it seemed like Smith was going to put together a first-rate team. As FedEx’s
initial COO Roger Frock put it: “How could I even consider joining Fred in his
crazy scheme?...I...knew that Art’s [head of air operations] broad vision and mel-
low personality would be tremendous assets for Federal Express.”4
There is empirical support for the idea that social connections yield substantial
returns. Hochberg et al. (2007), for instance, find that socially connected venture
capital firms do especially well. The VC industry, in general, is characterized by
strong network ties among VC firms that typically syndicate their deals with oth-
ers. Hochberg et al. (2007) find that the “centrality”5 of VCs in their network in-
crease their internal rates of return from 15% to 17% for a one-standard deviation
increase in centrality. Similarly, they find that the more central a VC firm, the bet-
ter the performance of its portfolio companies. A one standard deviation change
in VC centrality increases the probability that a portfolio company survives its first
funding-round from 66.8% to 72.4%. A possible interpretation of their findings is
that VC firms provide startups with network capital in exchange for a share of
their returns. Indeed, the well-known venture capitalist Marc Andreessen sees his
3One week, the financial situation was so desperate it seemed FedEx would be unable to fly. The
company needed $24,000 to buy jet fuel; they only had $5,000 in the bank. Smith took the $5,000
and headed to Las Vegas. Fortunately, he won $27,000.
4Frock (2006), p. 95.
5In the sense of “eigenvector centrality” (Bonacich (1972)).
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main role as to “give our founders...networking superpower.”6
Outside of economics, sociologist Ronald Burt pioneered the idea that social
capital matters for finance and entrepreneurship (see Burt (2004)). More recently,
economists have begun to explore the role of social capital for finance (see Guiso
et al. (2004); Hong et al. (2004, 2005), and Gompers et al. (2005)). We see our paper
as contributing to this (still nascent) literature.
The most closely related paper is Akerlof and Holden (2016). In that paper, we
consider a specific setting in which a networked agent — a “mover and shaker”
— can increase aggregate investment and earn a rent. This paper gives a more
general treatment of the capital-assembly problem; it is also much simpler. We ac-
complish this by stripping out informational considerations and focusing squarely
on agents’ coordination problem (using a risk-dominance-style refinement rather
than a global-games approach). Our methodology does not require us to make as-
sumptions about the shape of production functions. It reveals the importance of
block capital as well as network capital for coordinating investors. Importantly, we
are also able to embed our analysis within a market and study the nature of equi-
librium: both how block capital and network capital are deployed and the rents
they command.
Murphy et al. (1989) explore the idea that increasing returns can generate mul-
tiple equilibria. They propose this as a reason for poverty traps.7,8
There is a large literature in corporate finance on the value of controlling blocks
and large shareholders (see Grossman and Hart (1980) and Shleifer and Vishny
(1986) for early contributions and Becht et al. (2003) for further discussion and
references). In these models, the value of large stakes comes from control rights;
but there is scant consideration of the coordination problems involved in raising
capital.
6Tad Friend, “Tomorrow’s Advance Man,” New Yorker, May 18, 2015, retrieved from http:
//www.newyorker.com.
7By contrast, Romer (1986) considers increasing returns that come from technological rather
than pecuniary externalities. Relatedly, Aghion and Howitt (1992) emphasize the fact that techno-
logical innovations improve the quality of products, rendering previous, inferior ones, obsolete.
8The presence of increasing returns in our model also naturally brings to mind the trade litera-
ture on the subject — especially Krugman (1980, 1981), Helpman (1981), and Helpman and Krug-
man (1985). These models focus on a different issue from our paper. They assume, in contrast, that
the efficient scale can easily be achieved. They explore the tradeoff between efficiency (which is
achieved by industries being large) and variety (for which consumers have a preference).
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Our paper is also related to the literature on contribution games — especially
Andreoni (1998). In a charitable-giving context, he considers the role of a large
contributor or government in achieving successful coordination.9 Relative to An-
dreoni (1998), the novel features of our analysis are our focus on an investment
context and our examination of the rents associated with playing a pivotal role in
coordination.10
Building on the work of Segal (1999), who initiated a literature on contract-
ing with externalities, Bernstein and Winter (2012) and Sakovics and Steiner (2012)
study settings where large players can earn rents because of the positive externali-
ties they impose on smaller players. An example would be a shopping mall opera-
tor offering a discounted rental rate to a national brand store due to its importance
in driving traffic to smaller stores.11
Finally, in subsequent work, Halac et al. (2018) study a model similar to ours.
Their contribution relative to our work is to investigate, in the spirit of Andreoni
(1998), mechanisms that guarantee a unique Nash equilibrium.12 Focusing on such
mechanisms is relevant, for instance, when the principal is infinitely risk-averse
and so, when facing multiple equilibria, fears a terrible outcome; or when (as in
our model) the least preferred equilibrium is especially likely to arise.13
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the simple
price-theoretic treatment of our model. Section 3 develops the model more for-
mally. We first examine the role a large investor can play in assembling capital for
9In particular, Andreoni (1998) suggests that a charity may wish to select a set of donors to be
“leaders” who contribute prior to “followers.” We focus, by contrast, on the role of a single anchor
investor and characterize how large he must be in order to obtain the good-equilibrium outcome.
10There is also a literature on “catalytic finance” which considers the role of a large, non-strategic
player, such as the IMF, in avoiding coordination failures (see, for instance, Corsetti et al. (2006)
and Morris and Shin (2006)). These papers focus on what it takes for a publicly-minded actor (e.g.,
the IMF) to stop a coordination failure. Our focus, in contrast, is on when a selfish actor would find
it advantageous to stop a coordination failure (and the rents he would earn). These papers, unlike
us, are also interested in the moral hazard implications of bailouts.
11Our setting differs since all players impose externalities on all others (those externalities being
proportional to players’ size). Bernstein and Winter (2012)’s and Sakovics and Steiner (2012)’s
argument why the large player earns rents does not apply in our setting. In our theory large players
earn rents for a different reason: their particular ability to play a coordinating role.
12To guarantee that such mechanisms exist, they impose the assumption that the project succeeds
with positive probability even with a single, small investor.
13The game studied by Halac et al. (2018) is simultaneous in contrast to the game we study,
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Figure 1 – An example
a project; we then embed our analysis in a market setting (with multiple projects)
and analyze the market equilibrium; finally, we discuss how network capital might
substitute for block capital. Section 4 considers some issues raised by our theory
and Section 5 concludes. Formal proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 A simple treatment of the capital-assembly problem
Imagine a project owner is trying to assemble capital for a project. When k units
of capital are invested in the project, it yields a return f(k). Our theory can handle
production functions with any shape; for the purposes of illustration, though, as-
sume f(k) has the shape shown in Figure 1.14 The production function in Figure 1
exhibits increasing returns for intermediate values of k and decreasing returns for
high and low values of k.
Case 1: Small investors only
Suppose there are many risk averse investors, each with only a small amount
of capital. They can invest in the project or earn a market rate of interest, rmkt.
14For a discussion of how our theory generalizes to f(k) of any shape, see Section 3.4.
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We will show in the next section that there are two equilibria, one good and one
bad; however, the bad equilibrium is likely to prevail. In the bad equilibrium, the
project owner obtains kL units of capital at the market interest rate and receives
a payoff of ∆1. In the good equilibrium, the project owner receives the surplus-
maximizing amount of capital, kH , at the market interest rate and receives a payoff
of ∆2 > ∆1.
Why is the bad equilibrium likely to prevail? Observe that there is a region
in which the project is in the “red,” yielding an insufficient return to pay off in-
vestors (f(k) < (1 + rmkt)k). In Figure 1, this is the region between k1M and k
3
M , in
which f(k) dips below Line 1. Investors take a risk when they try to coordinate
on lending kH rather than kL, since the project may end up in the region in which
it is undercapitalized and in the “red.” In game-theoretic terms, the bad equilib-
rium “risk dominates” the good one. There is a large literature showing that risk
dominant equilibria tend to be focal.15
To summarize, we find that a bad equilibrium, with a kL-level of investment, is
likely to prevail when capital is disaggregated (i.e., investors have only negligible
amounts of it).
Case 2: One large investor
Let us assume now that, in addition to small investors, there is a large investor
with a block of capital of size kblock.
A large investor with a block of capital can potentially ensure the optimal level
of investment (kH). It is obvious that he can do so if kblock ≥ kH ; but he may be
able to bring about the optimal level of investment even if he is unable to fund the
entire project. For instance, a block of size k3M−k1M is adequate. Small investors are
happy to lend when the project is in the “black”; there is only reluctance to lend
between k1M and k
3
M , when the project is in the “red.” A block of size k
3
M − k1M is
enough to bridge this gap.
In fact, it turns out that the large investor can bring about the good equilibrium
with less capital still. It is sufficient to have a block of size k (k is graphically
represented in Figure 1). Suppose the large investor loans k for the project and,
15For notable early contributions see Cooper et al. (1990) and Huyck et al. (1990).
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additionally, enables the project owner to pay off small investors first. (This could
be achieved either by taking junior debt or equity in the project.) Small investors
are paid off in this scenario so long as f(k) does not dip below Line 2. f(k) is
tangent to Line 2 at k2M but never dips below; hence, small investors are certain to
be paid off. Since small investors need not worry about being paid off, they will be
willing to provide the project owner with the additional capital he needs to reach
the good equilibrium.
Therefore, a large investor with a block of size kblock ≥ k can generate a surplus
of size ∆2 −∆1.
Market rates of return: large versus small investors
Consider next a market setting, with many projects, in which interest rates are
endogenous. In a competitive capital market, if block capital is scarce, large in-
vestors earn higher rates of return than small investors. Large investors receive, in
addition to rmkt, the surplus their blocks help generate.
For example, an investor with a block of size k who invests in a project of the
type shown in Figure 1 receives (1 + rmkt)k+ (∆2−∆1).16 He therefore earns a rate
of return:




The difference between large investors’ and small investors’ rates of return is
potentially quite significant. A numerical example helps to illustrate. Figure 1
corresponds to a particular numerical example in which rmkt = 5% and f(k) =
2.55k − 0.0975k2 + 0.0016k3 − 0.0000075k4. In the good equilibrium, kH = 100 and
∆2 = 25; in the bad equilibrium, kL = 10 and ∆1 = 6.775. The block size needed
to reach the good equilibrium is k = 14.881. It follows that r = 127.5%. Therefore,
while a small investor earns a return of 5%, an investor with a block of size k earns
a return of 127.5%.
When projects are scarce as well as block capital, the rent distribution may be
different. Project owners may capture some rents as well as block holders. Block
capital is nonetheless critical for achieving efficient outcomes.
16The project owner receives a payoff of ∆1. Because of competition between project owners to




Suppose investors are networked. It might be possible for a central network
actor (C) to use his position to coordinate small investors on a high level of invest-
ment. Agent C substitutes for a block investor; hence, he should earn an equivalent
rent in a market equilibrium (i.e., ∆2 − ∆1 if the block investor for which he sub-
stitutes receives a rent of ∆2 −∆1).
We can think of agent C as possessing “network capital” and we can think of
∆2 −∆1 as the rent agent C earns on his network capital.
3 The formal model
This section develops the model more formally. It is organized along similar lines
to Section 2. Sections 3.1 through 3.4 consider a setting in which a project owner
is trying to raise capital from investors. We initially assume that there are only
small investors; we then show that a large investor can improve the overall level
of investment. Section 3.5 moves to a market setting, with many projects, and
examines the market equilibrium. Interest rates are endogenous (in contrast to
Sections 3.1 through 3.4).
3.1 Setup
The owner of a project is trying to raise capital from a set of potential investors
(i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}). Each investor possesses a small amount of capital, δ.
At time 1, the project owner decides (i) how much capital he will try to raise
(kP ≥ 0) and (ii) the interest rate (rP ≥ 0) he will pay to those who invest in the
project. We assume the project owner’s capital target, kP , must be a multiple of δ
(kP ∈ {0, δ, 2δ, 3δ, ...}).
At time 2, after observing the project owner’s choices, potential investors si-
multaneously decide under what circumstances they are willing to invest in the
project. Each investor chooses ai(κ) ∈ {0, 1} for all values of κ < kP that are multi-
ples of δ. ai(κ) = 1 indicates that investor i is willing to invest if the project owner
has raised κ units of capital at the point he approaches i.
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At time 3, the project owner approaches investors in a random order. Agent
i becomes an investor in the project if, when approached, he is willing to invest
(ai(κ) = 1) and the project owner has yet to meet his capital target kP (κ < kP ). Let
k denote the total amount of capital raised at time 3.17
At time 4, the project yields a return f(k). The project owner receives f(k) −
(1 + rP )k when the project is in the “black” (that is, when f(k)− (1 + rP )k ≥ 0) and
0 when the project is in the “red.” Agents who invested in the project receive a rate
of return rP when the project is in the “black”; they receive equal shares of f(k)
when the project is in the “red,” with an associated rate of return f(k)
k
− 1. Agents
who do not invest in the project receive the market rate of interest, rmkt.
The project owner is risk neutral. Investor i’s utility is given by u(wi), where wi
denotes the final wealth of investor i. u is strictly increasing and weakly concave:
u′ > 0, u′′ ≤ 0. wi is equal to δ(1+ri), where ri is investor i’s rate of return. As a tie-
breaking rule, we assume, for ease of later exposition, that investors prefer all else
equal to choose a(κ) = 1 when there is a positive probability of being approached
by a project owner who has raised κ and a(κ) = 0 otherwise.18
We make a set of simplifying assumptions regarding f(k). Under these as-
sumptions, f(k) resembles the production function in Figure 1. Later, we will dis-
cuss how our analysis can be generalized. Let π(k) = f(k) − (1 + rmkt)k. We
assume:
1. π(k) is continuous and π(0) = 0.
2. π(k) has its global maximum at kH ≤ nδ and π(kH) = ∆2.
3. π(k) also has a local maximum at kL < kH and π(kL) = ∆1.
4. π(k) < 0 if and only if k1M < k < k
3




M < kH .
5. π(k) has its global minimum at k2M and π(k
2
M) = −∆3.
6. δ < min(kL, ∆31+rmkt , k
3
M − k1M − ∆31+rmkt ).
17Note that we assume investors commit to an investment policy. We discuss the role of commit-
ment in our model in greater detail in Section 4.
18If we were to eliminate this tie-breaking rule, we would obtain nearly identical results. We use
this tie-breaking rule so that, in our later analysis, it is not necessary to assume that the project
owner pays small investors slightly more than the market rate (rmkt + ε).
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are all multiples of δ.19
3.2 Analysis
Let us compare two strategies the project owner might follow. Strategy 1: set out
to raise kL at the market rate of interest (kP = kL and rP = rmkt). Strategy 2: set out
to raise kH at the market rate of interest (kP = kH and rP = rmkt). (We will later
discuss whether there might be a third strategy that is preferable to these two.)
First, consider what happens when the project owner follows Strategy 1.
Proposition 1. Suppose, at time 1, the project owner sets out to raise kL at interest rate
rmkt. In the unique Nash equilibrium of the time-2 subgame, the project owner successfully
raises kL and receives a payoff of ∆1.
The project owner only seeks to raise kL and the project is in the black for all
k ≤ kL. Therefore, the project owner has no trouble raising kL from investors.
Now, consider what happens when the project owner follows Strategy 2.
Proposition 2. Suppose, at time 1, the project owner sets out to raise kH at interest rate
rmkt. There are two Nash equilibria of the time-2 subgame:
1. In one, the project owner only raises k1M and receives a payoff of 0.
2. In the other, the project owner successfully raises kH and receives a payoff of ∆2.
The time-2 subgame is a coordination game with two equilibria. In Equilibrium
1, investors are willing to invest up to the point the project dips into the red (ai(κ) =
1 if and only if κ < k1M ); this results in the project owner raising k
1
M . In Equilibrium
2, investors are willing to invest even when the project is in the red (ai(κ) = 1 for
all κ); this results in the project owner raising kH .
Observe that Strategy 1 yields a higher payoff if Equilibrium 1 prevails while
Strategy 2 yields a higher payoff if Equilibrium 2 prevails. As we will see presently,
Equilibrium 1 involves less strategic risk than Equilibrium 2. Therefore, the project
owner has good reason to think Equilibrium 1 will prevail and he has good reason
to select Strategy 1.
19We make Assumption 7 purely for ease of exposition, in order to avoid “integer issues.”
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Harsanyi and Selten (1988)’s concept of risk dominance captures the idea that
certain equilibria in coordination games may involve less strategic risk than oth-
ers. Suppose a (symmetric) 2x2 coordination game has two pure-strategy Nash
equilibria, (U,U) and (D,D). Players may be uncertain whether the other player
intends to play U or D. Harsanyi and Selten say that (U,U) risk dominates (D,D)
if players prefer to play U when the other player chooses U with probability 1
2
and
D with probability 1
2
.
Harsanyi and Selten’s original paper focuses on a limited class of games; how-
ever, an equilibrium concept proposed by Kets and Sandroni (2015) — “introspec-
tive equilibrium” — is more general.20. Introspective equilibrium is based upon
level-k thinking (see Crawford et al. (2013) for a survey). Kets and Sandroni as-
sume that each player has an exogenously-given “impulse” which determines how
he plays at level 0. At level k > 0, each player formulates a best response to the
belief that opponents are at level k − 1. Introspective equilibrium is defined as the
limit of this process as k →∞. A formal definition follows.
Definition 1 (Introspective Equilibrium at Time 2).
Investors are endowed with level-0 choices ai0(κ) called impulses. An introspective
equilibrium is constructed as follows:
1. Level k = 1, 2, ..., denoted {aik(κ)}ni=1, is obtained by letting each investor best-
respond to the belief that other investors are at level k − 1.
2. An introspective equilibrium is the limit as k →∞:
{a∗i (κ)}ni=1 = lim
k→∞
{aik(κ)}ni=1.
When players are uncertain regarding each others’ impulses, they face the type
of strategic risk envisioned by Harsanyi and Selten. In such settings, introspective
equilibrium is akin to a risk dominance refinement.
With this in mind, we make the following two assumptions regarding im-
pulses:21
20Several papers have suggested alternative approaches to risk dominance, such as Morris et
al. (1995) and Kojima (2006). Our reason for using Kets and Sandroni (2015)’s approach is that it
permits a natural interpretation of “network capital” in Section 3.6.
21Our results (in particular, Proposition 3) are robust to a wide range of assumptions regarding
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1. With probability θ, an investor’s impulse is to always invest (ai0(κ) = 1 for all
κ); with probability 1− θ, an investor’s impulse is to never invest (ai0(κ) = 0
for all κ).
2. It is common knowledge that θ is drawn from the uniform-[0, 1] distribution.
Under these assumptions, Equilibrium 1 is the unique introspective equilib-
rium of the time-2 game (see Proposition 3). In this sense, it risk dominates Equi-
librium 2.
Proposition 3. Suppose the project owner follows Strategy 2 at time 1. For all realizations
of investors’ impulses, Equilibrium 1 is the unique introspective equilibrium of the time-2
subgame.
Hence, when investors follow the introspective equilibrium, the project owner
prefers Strategy 1 to Strategy 2. A remaining question is whether there might be
a Strategy 3 that the project owner prefers to both Strategies 1 and 2. Clearly, it
would not be optimal to offer an interest rate below the market rate since this
leads to zero investment. It might be optimal, though, to offer a rate greater than
rmkt. Doing so might get agents to overcome their fear of investing in the project
when it is in the red. Specifically, Strategy 3 would involve offering an interest rate
r̃ > rmkt and seeking to raise k̃ = arg maxk[f(k)− (1 + r̃)k].
Proposition 4 (stated below) says that, if agents are sufficiently risk averse,
Strategy 1 is optimal.22 There are two reasons for this result. First, if agents are
sufficiently risk averse, no above-market interest rate will induce agents to invest
when the project is in the red. Second, even if it is possible to induce agents to
invest in the project when it is in the red, it may require paying a high interest rate.
If r̃ is large, the project owner’s payoff from raising k̃ at rate r̃ will be less than the
payoff from following Strategy 1 (∆1). In other words, the cost to the project owner
of paying the higher interest rate may exceed the benefit.
Proposition 4. Suppose investors follow the introspective equilibrium at time 2. There
exists a ρ such that the project owner prefers Strategy 1 to any other strategy whenever
impulses.
22There is a finite lower bound on how risk averse agents must be in order for Strategy 1 to be
optimal. Furthermore, this bound remains finite as δ → 0.
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investors’ risk aversion exceeds ρ (that is, ρ(w) > ρ for all w, where ρ(w) = − u
′(w)
u′′(w)
denotes investors’ coefficient of absolute risk aversion.)
Henceforth, we will assume that investors follow the introspective equilibrium.
We will also focus on the case where Strategy 1 is optimal. We focus on this case
for simplicity; but a version of our argument regarding the value of block capital
goes through even when Strategy 3 is optimal. In that case, block capital reduces
the interest rate the project owner needs to pay to small investors.
3.3 A large investor
Suppose that, in addition to small investors, there is one large investor with a block
of capital of size kblock (where kblock is a multiple of δ). The large investor has the
same utility function as small investors; and, like small investors, his outside op-
tion yields a rate of return rmkt. At time 1, the large investor can make a loan to the
project owner. A loan contract between the project owner and the large investor
specifies five things:
1. The loan size (klarge ≤ kblock).
2. The interest rate (rlarge).
3. Whether the loan is junior seniority or standard seniority.
4. The point at which the loan is to be made (κlarge).
5. The amount of capital the project owner will try to raise from small investors
(kP ) and the interest rate he will pay them (rP ).
Points 3 and 4 require further elaboration. We assume the loan can either be
junior seniority or standard seniority. If it is junior seniority, the large investor gets
paid off after small investors. If the loan is standard seniority, the large and small
investors have the same seniority; when the project is in the red, the large investor
receives a fraction of f(k) proportional to the amount of capital he loaned (klarge
k
).
κlarge denotes the point at which the large investor makes a loan. We assume
that the large investor puts klarge into the project at the point the project owner has
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raised κlarge from small investors. If the project owner never manages to raise κlarge
from small investors, the large investor does not put capital into the project and he
earns the market rate of interest on kblock.
We assume that the project owner and the large investor engage in Nash bar-
gaining over the contract and have equal bargaining power.
Analysis
If a large investor has sufficient capital, he can help the project owner reach kH .
For instance, if kblock ≥ kH , the large investor can loan the project owner all the
capital he needs (klarge = kH).
It is natural to ask how large kblock must be in order for the large investor to help
the project owner reach kH . First, suppose the large investor makes a standard-
seniority loan. A block of size k3M − k1M − δ is sufficient in this case. The large
investor can lend k3M − k1M − δ after the project owner has raised k1M from small
investors (klarge = k3M − k1M − δ and κlarge = k1M + δ), thereby bridging the region
where the project is in the red and small investors are unwilling to invest. If the
block size is any smaller, though, it is impossible to reach kH .
Now suppose the large investor makes a junior-seniority loan. To reach kH ,
the block only needs to be large enough to ensure that small investors are paid
off. It is easily shown that the minimum block-size that is sufficient to reach kH is
k = ∆3
1+rmkt
and k < k3M − k1M − δ. The block can be invested before — or just after
— the project owner has raised k1M from small investors: κlarge ≤ k1M + δ.
This leads to Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. The following describes the equilibrium when there is a large investor:
1. The project owner raises a total of kH if kblock ≥ k; the project owner raises kL
otherwise.
2. The large investor’s payoff is equal to (1 + rmkt) · kblock + ∆2−∆12 if kblock ≥ k; the
large investor’s payoff is (1 + rmkt) · kblock otherwise.
3. When kblock ≥ k, the contract between the project owner and the large investor
involves a loan of size klarge ≥ k. Furthermore, the loan is of junior-seniority if
klarge < k
3
M − k1M − δ.
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Observe that if the large investor is able to help the project owner reach kH (i.e,
kblock ≥ k), he earns a higher rate of return than small investors. In addition to
earning rmkt, he receives half of the surplus associated with reaching kH (∆2−∆12 ).
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Discussion
We have assumed that the large investor makes his investment decision before
small investors (at time 1 rather than time 2). This raises the question whether
the rents earned by the large investor are a consequence of his size or the order in
which he is approached.
Observe that the large investor is the only investor who values being approached
first. A small investor would not value moving first since he cannot, through an an-
chor investment, help the project owner reach kH . In contrast to small investors, if
the large investor moves early, he reduces strategic uncertainty for other investors
and thereby increases their willingness to invest. Furthermore, by reducing the
strategic uncertainty faced by small investors, the large investor reduces the strate-
gic uncertainty he himself faces.
Therefore, even if the large investor must compete for the right to invest first,
one would expect him to win this right — and at low cost. For instance, if the right
to move first is determined through a second-price auction, the large investor will
win the auction and pay zero since he is the only investor who positively values
the right.24
3.4 Other Production Functions
For ease of exposition, we restricted attention to production functions resembling
the one in Figure 1. Our analysis easily extends to other production functions.
For instance, Figure 2a shows a production function that exhibits increasing
23Even if the condition of Proposition 4 is not satisfied and it is possible to raise more than kL from
small investors by paying them in excess of rmkt, block capital still generates a surplus. It generates
a surplus since it eliminates the need to pay small investors more than rmkt. Consequently, the large
investor and the project owner still bargain over a surplus and the large investor earns a rent on his
block capital.
24Note that if the project owner decides which investor moves first, he may be able to hold up
the large investor and take some of his rents. However, such hold up is not possible in a market
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returns for low values of k rather than intermediate values of k. There is still a
“good” equilibrium and a “bad” equilibrium. In the bad equilibrium, zero capital
is invested in the project. In the good equilibrium, kH is invested in the project. The
good equilibrium generates a surplus of ∆; a block of capital of size k is needed in
order to reach it since f(k) dips into the red — down to Line 2 — between k = 0
and k = kH .
Figure 2b shows a more complicated production function. π(k) = f(k) − (1 +
rmkt)k has three local maxima — at kL, kM , and kH . The project owner can reach
kL without any help from a block investor because the project is in the black for
all k ≤ kL. To reach kM , the project owner must obtain some help from a large
investor since the project dips into the red between kL and kM . The project dips
down to Line 2 and hence a block of size k1 is required to reach kM . To reach kH ,
the project owner must obtain a larger block (of size k2) because the project dips
further into the red — down to Line 3 — between kM and kH .
Proposition 6 provides a more formal statement of how our results generalize.
Proposition 6. Consider a project with a production function f(k). Suppose, at time
1, the project owner receives a junior-seniority, anchor investment of size k from a large
investor at an interest rate rlarge and sets out to raise an additional k∗ − k in capital from
small investors at the market interest rate. In the resulting time-2 subgame, the project
owner succeeds in raising k∗ − k from small investors if and only if:
f(k)− (1 + rmkt)(k − k) ≥ 0 for all values of k ≤ k∗ that are multiples of δ.
3.5 Market Equilibrium
Our focus thus far has been on a single project and we have taken interest rates
as exogenous. It is natural at this point to consider a market setting with many
projects, in which interest rates are endogenous, and ask what a market equilib-
rium might look like.
A benchmark case to consider is a market with the following features:
1. There are multiple types of projects (where a project’s type is defined by its
production function); there are many projects of any given type.
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2. Each project has a different owner.
3. A set of potential investors possess blocks of capital of varying sizes.
4. Potential investors prefer to invest their capital — rather than consume it —
if they can earn an interest rate greater than or equal to r0.
5. In aggregate, potential investors possess an infinite (or very large) amount of
capital.
6. Block capital is scarce, however: for any k, there is a finite amount of capital
in blocks of size k or greater.
What can we say about the market equilibrium? First, an investor’s rate of
return will depend upon the size of his capital block. Let rmkt(k) denote the rate of
return on a block of size k.
Second, larger blocks will earn (weakly) more than smaller blocks in the fol-
lowing sense:
rmkt(k1 + k2) · (k1 + k2) ≥ rmkt(k1) · k1 + rmkt(k2) · k2 for all k1, k2.
This follows from the fact that blocks can always be broken up into smaller pieces.
Third, there will be some threshold, k̂, such that rmkt(k) = r0 for k < k̂ and
rmkt(k) > r0 for k ≥ k̂. Investors with blocks of size k̂ or greater will serve as
anchor investors for projects and thereby earn more than r0. Investors with smaller
blocks will not serve as anchor investors.
Fourth, anchor investors capture all of the surplus their blocks help to gener-
ate. For instance, suppose in the market equilibrium a project receives an anchor
investment of size k. Suppose further that this anchor investment increases the
overall level of investment in the project from kL to kH , generating a surplus of
size ∆2 −∆1. Then:




The reason block investors capture all of the surplus is that the supply of block
capital is scarce relative to projects. By contrast, in Section 3.3, the surplus (∆2−∆1)
was equally divided between the anchor investor and the project owner.
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Finally, blocks will be deployed in equilibrium on the projects that maximize
the size of the associated surplus (∆2 − ∆1). Given the scarcity of block capital,
many projects will be undercapitalized in equilibrium. Furthermore, depending
upon block interest rates, a project of the type shown in Figure 2b might be funded
up to kM (rather than kL or kH).25
Assumptions 1-6 are clearly strong and it is important to remember that they
are only meant to serve as a benchmark. In particular, one could imagine settings
where there are relatively few projects or where block capital is abundant. In such
a setting, ∆2 −∆1 might by partially or wholly captured by the project owner.26
Network Capital
If investors are networked, a central network actor might be able to substitute
for block capital. The central actor might be able to use his position to coordi-
nate small investors on a high level of investment (for instance, by flipping their
“impulses”). We would expect such central actors to earn rents on their “network
capital” equivalent to those earned by large investors.27
4 Discussion of the Model
In our model, block and network capital earn rents since they are scarce resources
that are essential for capital assembly. A natural question is whether this finding
is sensitive to the particular choice of modeling environment. We now consider a
number of issues, in turn, that are potentially consequential.
First: could project owners and investors write conditional contribution con-
tracts, whereby investors’ capital only goes into a project if the total amount pledged
25The owner of a project of the type shown in Figure 2b will base his decision of how much capital
to obtain on the interest premiums on blocks of capital of size k1 and k2. If the project owner obtains
kL units of capital, his payoff is f(kL)− (1 + rmkt(0))kL. If the project owner obtains kM (kH ) units,
his payoff is f(kM )−(1+rmkt(0))kM−(rmkt(kM )−rmkt(0))k1 (f(kH)−(1+rmkt(0))kH−(rmkt(kH)−
rmkt(0))k2). The project owner will choose the level of funding so as to maximize his payoff.
26A possible concern is that, under perfect competition, the project owner is not incentivized to
coordinate small investors since he receives no rents from doing so. However, the perfect competi-
tion case is best thought of as a limiting case. When competition is strong — but not perfect — the
project owner is still properly incentivized.
27For a formalization of this possibility, see our SSRN working paper.
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is above a threshold? Such contracts would seem to solve the capital-assembly
problem; hence one might expect to see them with great regularity. We do, in fact,
see such contracts: “Kickstarter” being a notable example. However, conditional
contribution contracts are far from ubiquitous, and this begs the question as to
why. One reason is that it is usually easy to walk away from such pledges. An
escrow account might help but such accounts are known to be far from airtight.
Furthermore, there is an incentive to wait to contribute to see what other investors
will do, which leads to a problem of a “race to the last.” Waiting retains one’s
option value; and there is also an informational benefit of waiting.
Second: there would seem to be an incentive for project owners to start projects
only after they have finished raising capital. A project owner who tries but fails
to raise kH could thereby invest only kL in the project and return the remaining
capital to investors. While delaying the start of a project can help solve the capital-
assembly problem, there may be large costs associated with delay. Furthermore,
project delay may send a negative signal to investors regarding a project owner’s
ability to raise capital.28
Third: arguably, the project owner faces strategic risk (not just investors). Put
differently, in our model, the project owner moves before investors and so is not
part of the introspective equilibrium at time 2. For instance, suppose the project
owner decides the capital target, kP , at time 2 rather than time 1. In this case,
continuing to approach investors past kL (i.e., choosing kP > kL) is strategically
risky for the project owner since he might fail to raise kH and end up with a payoff
below ∆1. The large investor is even more vital in this setting since he allays the
fears not only of investors but also of the project owner.29
Fourth: one wonders whether the large investor solves the coordination prob-
lem merely by his presence. Even without investing, small investors’ fears might
be allayed by the thought that the large investor will do so should the project run
into trouble. The large investor must actually make an anchor investment to solve
the coordination problem if small investors believe there is even a small chance the
large investor will disappear. In a market setting, furthermore, large investors are
28Furthermore, there might be transaction costs or liquidation costs associated with temporarily
investing funds in the market.
29Note that, if the large investor invests early, it reduces strategic uncertainty for himself as well
as other players.
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unlikely to stay around in perpetuity as there are alternative projects in which they
can invest.
Fifth: our model suggests that small investors might want to contract with a
proxy to act on their collective behalf. The proxy would allow the small investors
to behave as if they were a single, large investor. Arguably, private equity and
activist hedge funds play such a role. An issue, however, is that it may be hard
to align the proxy’s interests with those of small investors. Such moral hazard
considerations explain, for instance, why there are typically limits placed on the
size of single investments, and the class of securities in which fund managers can
invest.
Sixth: our model assumes that small investors commit to an investment policy.
In the absence of commitment, the “bad” equilibrium can unravel. If the project
owner tries to raise kH , the last investor needed to reach kH will invest; the second-
to-last investor, recognizing this, will invest; by iteration, all investors are prepared
to invest. This unraveling argument is fragile, however. For instance, it falls apart
if the project’s return (f(k)) is not strict common knowledge.30
Seventh: We have assumed that small investors do not condition their strategies
on the order in which they are approached. This may be a realistic assumption
since investors may not know who has been approached before them. However,
were investors able to condition their strategies on order (i.e., ai(κ, order)), it would
not change conclusions. In this case, there is an analog of Proposition 3 in which
the project owner only raises k1M from small investors when he sets out to raise kH .
Eighth: large investors in our model subordinate their claims to those of small
investors (either by taking equity or junior debt in the project). This prediction is
stark and may not perfectly reflect what we see in reality. The starkness of this
prediction is an artifact, though, of our assumption that the project is riskless (i.e.,
30To illustrate why common knowledge matters, consider a setup as in Section 3.1 with one
difference: while each investor knows the value of k3M , k
3
M (the point where the project moves
from “red” back to “black”) is not common knowledge. If the project owner has already raised
k ≥ k3M , investors will contribute to the project. The last investor needed to reach k3M will also
invest in the project given that he can tip the project into the black. However, it does not follow by
backward induction that the second-to-last investor needed to reach k3M will be willing to invest.
While the second-to-last investor understands that the next investor can tip the project into the
black, he does not know whether the next investor will understand this himself (given that k3M is
not common knowledge). Hence, the unraveling argument breaks down. One way to think about
anchor investments is that they reduce the need for common knowledge.
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our assumption that f(k) is non-random). Recall that a large investor subordinates
his claim in our model because it reduces the amount of capital he needs to invest
to bring about the “good equilibrium.” If the project is risky, however, there is an
additional consideration. The large investor exposes himself to greater risk if he
subordinates his claim. This second consideration might outweigh the first.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have examined the capital-assembly problem, which arises when
there are increasing returns to investment. We have argued that holders of block
capital play an important role in capital assembly. By serving as anchor investors
for projects, they can increase the overall level of investment. Similarly, central
network actors are important because they can use their position to coordinate
small investors.
The potentially large returns earned by holders of block and network capital
have implications for income inequality. Our theory also has implications for cor-
porate finance. The problem we study may have a range of further implications. It
is common (e.g., in growth theory) to assume that projects/ideas are in short sup-
ply. In contrast, the scarce resources in our theory are network and block capital.
Our theory therefore shifts the focus from the challenge of generating ideas to the
challenge of implementing and executing them.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose the project owner follows Strategy 1 at time 1 (i.e.,
he chooses kP = kL and rP = rmkt). Let us consider the resulting time-2 subgame.
It is clearly an equilibrium for all investors to choose a(κ) = 1 for all κ < kP .
Hence, an equilibrium exists in which the project owner raises kL. Furthermore,
this is the unique equilibrium in which the project owner raises kL since, if the
project owner is going to raise kL, it is optimal for an investor to choose a(κ) = 1
for all κ < kP (given the tie-breaking rule).
We can prove by contradiction that an equilibrium does not exist in which the
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project owner raises less than kL. Suppose the project owner raises k̂ < kL in
equilibrium with positive probability. Given that the project is in the “black” for all
k ∈ [0, kL] and given investors’ tie-breaking rule, investors will all choose a(k̂) =
1. Therefore, if the project owner manages to raise k̂, investors always give him
additional capital. It follows that the project owner can never raise exactly k̂ (which
is a contradiction). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose the project owner follows Strategy 2 at time 1 (i.e.,
he chooses kP = kH and rP = rmkt). Let us consider the resulting time-2 subgame.
We can prove by contradiction that an equilibrium does not exist in which the
project owner raises k̂ ∈ (k1M , k3M) with positive probability. Suppose such an equi-
librium exists. Given that the project is in the “red” at k̂, investors’ payoffs are
lower than they would be if they never invested in the project. Hence, investors
are not best-responding (which is a contradiction).
We can also prove by contradiction that an equilibrium does not exist in which
the project owner raises less than k1M . Suppose the project owner raises k̂ < k
1
M
in equilibrium with positive probability. Given that the project is in the “black”
for all k ∈ [0, k1M ] and given investors’ tie-breaking rule, investors will all choose
a(k̂) = 1. Therefore, if the project owner manages to raise k̂, investors always give
him additional capital. It follows that the project owner can never raise exactly k̂
(which is a contradiction).
Furthermore, by an analogous argument, an equilibrium does not exist in which
the project owner raises k̂ ∈ [k3M , kH) with positive probability.
To summarize, for all values of k̂ except k1M and k
H , we have ruled out that the
project owner can raise k̂ with positive probability in equilibrium.
Now, suppose the project owner raises k1M with positive probability. Given that
the project dips into the red when k ∈ (k1M , k3M), investors all prefer to choose
a(k1M) = 0. If investors all choose a(k
1
M) = 0, the project owner cannot raise more
than k1M . Furthermore, we have already shown that an equilibrium does not exist
in which the project owner raises less than k1M with positive probability. Hence, if
the project owner raises k1M with positive probability in equilibrium, he raises k
1
M
with probability 1 in equilibrium.
At this point, we have shown that at most two types of equilibria exist: (1) an
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equilibrium in which the project owner raises k1M with probability 1, and (2) an
equilibrium in which the project owner raises kH with probability 1. Let us now
show existence of such equilibria.
It is clearly an equilibrium for all investors to choose a(κ) = 1 for κ < k1M and
a(κ) = 0 for κ ≥ k1M . This results in the project owner raising k1M . Furthermore, this
is the unique equilibrium in which the project owner raises k1M since, if the project
owner is going to raise k1M , it is optimal for investors to choose a(κ) = 1 for κ < k
1
M
and a(κ) = 0 for κ ≥ k1M (given their tie-breaking rule).
It is also clearly an equilibrium for investors to choose a(κ) = 1 for all κ. This
results in the project owner raising kH . Furthermore, this is the unique equilibrium
in which the project owner raises kH since, if the project owner is going to raise kH ,
it is optimal for investors to choose a(κ) = 1 for all κ (given their tie-breaking rule).
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose the project owner follows Strategy 2 at time 1 (i.e.,
he chooses kP = kH and rP = rmkt). Let us consider the resulting time-2 subgame.
In particular, let us examine what happens in the time-2 subgame when investors
are at level k.
When investors are at level 0, they simply follow their impulses.
When investors are at level 1, they choose not to invest (ai(κ) = 0) for κ < k3M−δ
and they choose to invest (ai(κ) = 1) for κ ≥ k3M−δ. The reason is as follows. When
κ ≥ k3M − δ, it makes sense to invest since there is no risk the project will end up in
the “red.” (Furthermore, investors believe there is a positive probability they will
be approached by a project owner who has raised κ ≥ k3M − δ). On the other hand,
if investor i invests when κ < k3M − δ, he believes there is a positive probability he
will have invested in a project that ends up in the “red.” Consequently, it does not
make sense to invest when κ < k3M − δ.
When investors are at level 2, they choose to invest if and only if κ = 0. The
reason is as follows. Since each investor believes other investors are at level 1, they
believe there is zero probability of being approached by a project owner who has
raised κ > 0. Investors choose ai(κ) = 0 for κ > 0 given their tie-breaking rule.
On the other hand, there is a positive probability of being approached by a project
owner who has raised κ = 0. Furthermore, there is zero probability of the project
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ending up in the “red” if investor i invests when κ = 0; hence, investor i will
choose to do so.
When investors are at level 3, they choose to invest if and only if κ ≤ δ. The rea-
soning is analogous to the reasoning for level 2. Given other investors are believed
to be at level 2, investors assign zero probability to being approached by a project
owner who has raised κ > δ. Hence, investors choose ai(κ) = 0 for κ > δ. On the
other hand, there is a positive probability of being approached by a project owner
who has raised κ ≤ δ. Furthermore, there is zero probability of the project ending
up in the “red” if investor i invests when κ ≤ δ; hence, investor i will choose to do
so.
Applying the same logic, at level 4, investors will invest if and only if κ ≤ 2δ.
At level 5, investors will invest if and only if κ ≤ 3δ. Eventually, we will reach a
level k̂ where investors invest if and only if κ < k1M .
Observe that, at level k̂ + 1, investors follow that same strategy as at level k̂:
they invest if and only if κ < k1M . We conclude, then, that in the limit as k → ∞,
investors’ strategy is to invest if and only if κ < k1M . This results in the project
owner raising k1M units of capital in the introspective equilibrium. This completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose the project owner follows a “Strategy 3” of the form
rP = r̃ and kP = k̃, where r̃ > rmkt and k̃ = arg maxk[f(k) − (1 + r̃)k]. Let us
consider the resulting time-2 subgame. In particular, let us examine what happens
in the time-2 subgame when investors are at level k.
When investors are at level 0, they simply follow their impulses.
Provided investors are sufficiently risk averse, at level 1 they choose not to in-
vest for κ < k3M − δ and they choose to invest for κ ≥ k3M − δ. The reason is
as follows. When κ ≥ k3M − δ, it makes sense to invest since there is no risk of the
project yielding investors a return below rmkt (note: there is a risk still of the project
yielding a return below r̃). (Furthermore, investors believe there is a positive prob-
ability they will be approached by a project owner who has raised κ ≥ k3M − δ).
When κ < k3M − δ, investors believe there is a positive probability that the project
will yield them a return below rmkt. There is also an upside risk to investing: the
project yields investors a return above rmkt with positive probability. However, if
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investors are sufficiently risk averse (i.e., ρ > ρ), it follows from Jensen’s inequality
that the downside risk will outweigh the upside risk and they will choose not to
invest when κ < k3M − δ.
The remainder of the proof follows along identical lines to the proof of Propo-
sition 3. At level 2, investors choose to invest if and only if κ = 0 (see the proof
of Proposition 3 for the reasoning). At level 3, investors choose to invest if and
only if κ > δ. Eventually, we reach a level k̂ where investors invest if and only if
κ < k1M . For levels greater than k̂, investors follow the same strategy as at level k̂.
Hence, we conclude that in the limit as k → ∞, investors’ strategy is to invest if
and only if κ < k1M . This results in the project owner raising k
1
M units of capital in
the introspective equilibrium.
Observe that the project owner’s payoff in equilibrium is 0. Hence, the project
owner prefers Strategy 1 (which yields a payoff of ∆1) to Strategy 3. This completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. Part 1 of the proposition follows immediately from the as-
sumption of efficient Nash bargaining and the observation that it is possible to
reach kH (and generate a surplus of ∆2 − ∆1) if and only if the large investor’s
block is of size k or greater. Part 2 follows from the assumption of 50-50 Nash
bargaining, which means that the large investor receives half the surplus (∆2−∆1
2
)
whenever a surplus is generated. Part 3 follows from the observation that, if
klarge < k
3
M − k1M − δ, it it is only possible to reach kH if the large investor’s loan is
junior seniority. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider the time-2 subgame described in the statement of
Proposition 6.
First, suppose f(k)− (1 + rmkt)(k − k) ≥ 0 for all values of k ≤ k∗ that are mul-
tiples of δ. The large investor’s junior-seniority investment of size k ensures that
small investors cannot earn less than rmkt if they invest in the project. Therefore, it
is quite clear that, in the introspective equilibrium, small investors always invest
(ai(κ) = 1 for all value of κ) and the project owner succeeds in raising k∗ − k.
Now suppose f(k) − (1 + rmkt)(k − k) < 0 for some values of k ≤ k∗ that are
multiples of δ. Let k̂ denote the minimum such value of k. Following an argument
identical to that given in the proof of Proposition 3, the introspective equilibrium
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involves agents agreeing to invest if and only if κ < k̂−δ. Hence, the project owner
only raises k̂−δ units of capital from small investors. This completes the proof.
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